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Introduction
Communication students are interested in the variables 
which affect the meaning of a message as it is received by 
some person or persons. It is a basic research goal of com­
munication theorists to. discover those language variables 
which make a difference. In general, they wish to know what 
combination of variables which, if manipulated independently, 
will produce differences in meaning to the receiver.
Previous descriptive and experimental research has 
discovered several significant correlations of various 
syntactical message variables with certain cognitive struc­
tures, responses, and abilities. Such research suggests that 
further manipulation of syntactical variables may prove 
valuable to the field of communication.
This proposal is designed to study experimentally one 
such manipulation of a syntactical variable in a given 
message communicated to differing types of receivers. The 
dependent variable is meaning as it is reflected in changes 
of attitude toward the topic and the source, and in compre­
hension scores. To be more specific, this study asks if 
different degrees of class content modifiers will affect 
differentially comprehension of the message, the credibility 
of the source, and the attitudes of high and low dogmatic 
receivers.
A random sample of subjects was drawn from the basic 
course in Speech Communication at the University of Oklahoma 
in the spring semester of 1971, Using the Powell-Troldahl 
(1965) shorter version of Rokeach’s (I960) dogmatism scale, 
subjects were blocked into high and low (fixed independent 
variable) dogmatic groups based on a median split. At the 
same time, attitudes were ascertained on five topics of 
current interest. From these, one topic was selected which 
best approximated a theoretic distribution.
A persuasive message, presented in written form, was 
prepared on the topic chosen for use in this experiment.
The message contained rationales for supporting the propo­
sition, and asserted that persons opposing the proposition 
are ignorant and their objections unfounded. This basic 
message was the same for all experimental groups except for 
the alterations in syntax, the treatment variable. There 
were two syntactical treatment conditions; (1) modifiers 
of the main content classes in the message which were 
hypothesized as functioning to close those categories either 
inclusively or exclusively, and (2) modifiers which were 
hypothesized as functioning to keep the content categories 
open. Some operational definitions are in order.
Subjects and objects are syntactical categories which 
function to specify a "class of content" usually identified 
as persons, places, things, concepts, etc. In a like manner, 
predicates represent a class of content identified as
existences and actions. Hence, the content classes of a 
message can be defined operationally as any word or phrase 
which functions as a subject, object, or predicate. The 
important thing to note is that syntax identifies and relates 
message content in terms of classes or categories, even if 
the specified content is a singular.
It also should be stressed, here that although conjunc­
tions, prepositions, adjectives, adverbs— both words and 
phrases— generally function to modify, point and/or connect 
main content classes, they may in many sentence structures 
be an inherent part of the content class identified. "On 
the table," may identify the location of an object without 
being a part of the object. On the other hand, the "dining" 
in "dining table" is a definite identifying property of the 
class content.
Among the many syntactic modifications and connections 
which can be made, the two of most interest here are those 
which function to close or specifically leave open the con­
tent classes. Some examples of modifiers which close the 
content classes are all, none, always, never, either-or. and 
only. Examples of modifiers which serve to keep the 
categories open are some, sometimes, to a small degree, and 
partially.
One treatment group was given the basic message 
heavily weighted with only closing type modifiers. The 
second treatment group was given the basic message using
only open type modifiers. Following a Solomon modified four 
group design, two control groups were used. One control 
group received a message irrelevant to the experimental topic, 
but was given the same pre-posttests as the two experimental 
ones; the other group was given only the posttests.
Dependent variables were comprehension, source credi­
bility, and attitude change. It was hypothesized that there 
would be differing effects on these dependent variables 
resulting from the different syntactical treatments upon 
stratifî tf -dogmatic types.
The structure of this study is as follows: Chapter I,
Rationale and Hypotheses of the Study; Chapter II, Method of 
Analysis; Chapter III, Results and Discussion; Chapter IV, 
Summary and Suggestions for further study.
Chapter I 
Rationale and Hypotheses
This chapter presents the theoretic considerations 
and hypotheses for this experimental study. The relevant 
literature is reviewed and compared with the conceptual 
analysis presented here. The organization of this chapter 
is in five parts: General Background; The Functions of
Syntax; Comprehension, Credibility, and Attitudes; Syntax 
and Dogmatism; and Hypotheses.
General Background
The problem of meaning is of concern to many disci­
plines, Its importance is such that Langer (1964) asserted 
that the concept of meaning has become the dominant philo­
sophical concept of our time. In psychology, the relatively 
new area of psycho-linguistics has become a prominent area 
in research. Communication, of course, has always been 
concerned with meaning as it relates to the response of 
receivers.
Experimentally, meaning has been studied in a variety 
of ways. Morris (1946) identified three levels of semiotics: 
semantic (sign to significate), pragmatic (sign to person), 
and syntactic (sign to sign). Creelman (I966), Osgood, Suci, 
& Tannenbaum (1957), and George Miller & McNeill (1954) 
review many of the theories and studies about meaning. Most
of these studies have been concerned with the semantic and 
pragmatic dimensions of signs. Syntactical meaning has been 
largely unexplored.
Although experimental studies in syntactical meaning 
are few, its importance has not gone unnoticed. Razran (1952) 
indicated some of the problems and contributions of syntax to 
meaning. Osgood (1957) showed his awareness of its importance, 
and Cummings (1970) produced a major descriptive study of 
syntax; he also suggested that Osgood’s evaluative assertion 
analysis studies were syntactical. George Miller (1965) was 
stressing the need for a study of syntax when he said, "The 
meaning of an utterance is not a linear sum of the meanings 
of the words that comprise it /p. 18/."
In increasing numbers, researchers in communication 
have been reporting studies (to be reviewed later in this 
paper) relating to syntax, a fact indicative of its increas­
ing significance. The importance of this variable should 
not be underestimated. The meaning of any set of words in 
a message is governed by the syntax; in that sense, it is 
the most important factor in a message.
Using a distinction made by Osgood (1966), syntax 
can be approached from two points of view: the obligatory
and the variable. The grammatical rules governing sentence 
structure which make communication possible can be referred 
to as an "obligatory" syntax. The various means of express­
ing a given message content while remaining within the
obligatory framework can be thought of as questions about a 
"variable" syntax.
In the variable sense, "John threw the ball," and 
"The ball was thrown by John," says the same thing but with 
different structures. Both sentences are also grammatical 
in the "obligatory" sense.
"Threw John ball the," is immediately recognizable 
as an incorrect sentence, syntactically, by any native 
speaker— which is one criterion of whether a sentence is 
grammatical (Chomsky, 1961). This non-sentence violates 
the native patterns— patterns which must be agreed to if 
communication is to occur on other than chance basis.
This study is not interested in questions concerning 
the requirements of the obligatory syntax. This experiment 
is limited to a small subset of the "variable" type of 
syntax. Put in other terms, the same content of a given 
message can be communicated by many different structures, 
all of which can be correct grammatically. Given the 
requirements of a content and a grammar, will the use of 
differing type words, phrases, and sentences affect the 
meaning of the content as it is perceived by its receivers? 
It is from this general area that the specific experimental 
proposition is derived: What are the effects of open-closed
type modifications of the message content on the comprehen­
sion, attitudes, and source credibility of high and low 
dogmatic receivers?
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The Functions of Syntax
An essential cognitive ability, perhaps the most 
important one that a human possesses, is the ability to 
generalize and discriminate. This ability tells us every­
thing from differences between edible and inedible foods, 
friendly and threatening actions, to good and bad anything.
The raw material for the generalization and discrim­
ination processes is stimuli— stimuli capable of carrying 
differential characteristics of objects in our external and 
internal worlds. Whatever one takes meaning to be, the 
position here is that it results from comparisons of incoming 
stimuli interacting with past experiences. Such comparisons 
obviously could not occur without the differential properties 
of stimuli.
A person can look at a car and in one glance notice 
differences in color, patterns, textures, etc. Whether the 
car is responded to as being large or small, good or bad, 
bright or dull, real or fake will depend upon comparisons 
of one or more of its various characteristics with one*s 
past experiences with cars, transportation needs, prestige, 
suggestion, etc. ^
On the other hand, verbal signs carry none of the 
characteristics of the significates they represent.
Language makes up for this deficiency in two important ways: 
(1) its lexical component provides labels for all signif­
icates; everything which can be observed, imagined, inferred
is given a label; and (2) its syntactical component provides 
for word groupings according to specified usage functions. 
Subjects and objects (verb complements) identify a class of 
content commonly referred to as persons, places, things. 
Predicates function to identify a class of existences and 
actions (is, have, do. etc-.), and relate these with subjects 
and objects; Prepositions, adjectives, and adverbs, both 
words and phrases, identify a class of content which func­
tions to modify subjects, predicates, and objects. Other 
grammatical words and devices such as articles, conjunctions, 
relative pronouns, demonstrative adjectives, etc., usually 
do not represent content; they function variously, to point 
and to connect signs which do represent significates.
These lexical and syntactical elements can be specif­
ically related to the process of generalization and discrim­
ination. First, the lexical component of language serves 
both functions simultaneously. The act of stating any class 
word is the act of identifying a class of objects having 
certain similar characteristics in common which collectively 
are different from the common characteristics of all other 
objects.
Second, the syntactical component expresses relations 
within or among classes which can be identified as repre­
senting belonging or difference relations. In Osgood*s (1957) 
evaluative assertion analysis, these relations would be 
characterized as associative and dissociative relations 
respectively.
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Third, modifiers serve both generalizing and differ­
ence functions depending on usage. Some examples will help 
to clarify these relations.
In the sentence, "John is" (lexically speaking)
"John" is a label for a specific member of the human class, 
different from all other humans in the class; and the label 
iris" represents a class of existences different from non­
existences (negatives). The syntactical relation expressed 
in the sentence is one of belonging. It tells the receiver 
that "John" and "existence” are to be seen together.
In "Young John is an Indian," there are three rela­
tions: (1) "John" belonging to "existence," (2) "John"
belonging to "Indian," and (3) "John" belonging to "Young." 
/Osgood (1963), utilized this type of sentence transforma­
tion Sj;./ These relations are all belonging ones. Differences 
in these sentences exist only in the lexical sense of each 
word representing a different class. Now an important dis­
tinction must be made. "Young John" is a belonging relation; 
however, it may be used within a context as a means of 
expressing difference. For example, if within the context 
of the communication, there is a John Jr., and a John Sr^, 
then the belonging relation "Young John" is used to express 
a distinction, i.e., Jr., not Sr.
Given the sentence, "John is part Indian," "part" is 
a modifier,indicating a difference: "part Indian" is diff­
erent from "Indian." In a like manner, the prepositional
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phrase in "John is good in some ways," is indicative of a 
difference relation.
A shift to action verbs does not change the analysis. 
In "John murdered Bill," "John" is identified as belonging 
to an action class, "murderers."
Negatives, as in "John is not a murderer," represent 
difference relations. All., always, never., only, totally, 
etc., are modifiers which indicate an inclusive-exclusive 
relation of either the belonging or difference kind; they 
do not admit to degree, and hence the relations do not admit 
to exception. In the sentence, "All men have a nervous 
system," the belonging relation covers every member. These 
modifiers function to close the content classes, and will 
be subsequently referred to in this study as closing type 
modifiers. They will not always be single words; sometimes
they may be sentences and even paragraphs.
Modifiers such as some, frequently, and to some extent
specifically function to alert the receiver to the fact that
the stated relation is one of degree and not an absolute one. 
These modifiers will be referred to as open type modifiers.
This brief analysis has been made to establish one 
important point: identifying, connecting, and separating
significates with belonging or difference relations by means 
of grammar is the equivalent of generalizing and discrimin­
ating about direct observations of significates.
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Comprehension, Credibility, and Attitudes
This representative process has significant conse­
quences for communication. Signs make it possible not only 
to think and communicate about significates which are not 
present, but also about significates which have no objective 
existence outside the mind: Gods and devils, love. Socialism,
good, etc. These advantages, bring along certain inherent 
disadvantages.
The communication of content via representational 
means makes misrepresentation a relatively easy matter. It 
makes the credibility of any message questionable. Verbal 
signs can be manipulated at will, irrespective of reality 
and knowledge. They can be arranged to represent the 
opposite of the actual relations among significates.
The only direct check upon such deceptions is the 
receiver’s past experience which may indicate that the 
stated relation is inconsistent with his prior knowledge.
The check is as good as a person’s experience; however, 
since a person’s direct experience with the world is 
relatively small, the check is not all that strong. Cer­
tainly, it hasn’t been strong enough to discourage deception. 
As a result of the frequent inability of receivers to check 
directly the truth of messages, a secondary, indirect means 
is often used: the receiver attempts to evaluate the source.
Representation also makes unintentional error easier. 
For example, representational thinking allows the creation
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of strictly verbal categories: old people, good people,
tall people. Such categories illustrate the serious prob­
lem of degree: how tall is tall? how many years lived
equals old?
The problem with such verbal categories extends 
beyond one of degree. Persons may, and of course do, impose 
opposing values on the same external significates. "Labor 
union" may be idealized by some as the savior of the working 
man from the "greedy, selfish, thoughtless, inhuman business 
power combines," while others think of the unions as being 
the corrupt power brokers. Consequently, existing values, 
more than the incoming stimuli, will mediate the term when 
it is used in a message.
The language does not represent degrees in any 
adequate sense. Space can be scaled precisely, but tall 
and short are matters of relativity. Good and bad are 
inclusive terms, but what they represent can hardly ever be 
described in such an inclusive manner. At best, the language 
allows for a crude specification of degree by adding modifiers 
such as: sometimes, often, under some circumstances, most,
etc. Hence, if "This is a great Democracy," is used in a 
message, the receiver has not only the problem of referent, 
for the terms, but one of degree as well. These are matters 
of clarity.
These problems are traditionally referred to and 
studied as problems of source credibility, attitude change.
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and comprehension. McGuire (1965) reviews these variables 
and their respective studies. Credibility is most frequently 
studied as an independent variable. It has come to be recog­
nized as having strong persuasive appeal. McGuire (1965) 
reviews the many studies relating to credibility.
Recently, more studies have utilized credibility as 
a-dependent variable in recognition of the fact that the 
attainment of a high credibility status also is achieved 
through communication (Gerald Miller & Lobe, 1967; Gerald 
Miller & Baseheart, 1969; and Bowers, 1963), That is, what 
a source says (as well as what is said and known about him) 
may influence his credibility rating with his receivers.
Attitude change, including the development of new 
attitudes, has long been thought to be a prerequisite to 
inducing behavior (McGuire, I965). This assumption, however, 
has been challenged. Festinger (1957) produced attitude 
change following behaviorial change. Gerald Miller (1966) 
reviewed the problem with stress on the weak "pencil type" 
attitude measures and suggested further attempts to improve 
attitude measurement. Zimbardo & Ebbesen (1969) reported a 
"social learning" theory of behavior which discards the 
attitude concept altogether.
Such attacks may serve the vital function of refining 
and improving research, but it isn't likely that the attitude 
concept will be ignored. These critics have shown that 
attitudes (at least as measured) and behavior do not
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correspond in many cases* The lack of correspondence in 
some cases should not suggest that attitude is consequently 
a useless concept. Something akin to what is labeled 
"attitude" exists and such attitudes serve useful functions 
for man (Katz, I960).
Comprehension of the message is an obvious prerequisite 
to securing the desired response. The learning of a given 
response must follow comprehension of at least the proposal 
of the source. It is therefore a crucial variable in 
communication.
A summary of the development of the rationale for 
this study is in order. Since language is representational, 
the important cognitive process of seeing objects as belong­
ing together (generalization) on the basis of similarity of 
characteristics, or distinguishing objects on the basis of 
differing characteristics (discrimination) is managed gram­
matically in two ways. First, all significates are labeled. 
Second, such verbal signs are then syntactically grouped 
into functional classes: subjects, predicates, objects,
modifiers, connectors, etc. The arrangement of these classes 
into sentences serves the function of identifying significates 
(i.e., things, existences, actions) and indicating which ones 
belong or don’t belong together.
Three problems of representation were discussed. Verbal 
signs make it easy for intentional deception and unintentional 
errors to be made; different people do have different values
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for the same significates; and, content and content relations 
concerning either external or internal categories are often 
subjective matters of degree.
The representational problems introduce source cred­
ibility, attitudes, and comprehension as major variables 
affecting the meaning of verbal communication. For these 
reasons, communication researchers often choose one or more 
of these variables for experimental study. They can and 
have been used as both independent and dependent variables.
In this study, they will be dependent variables.
Syntax and Dogmatism
We have seen that syntax contributes to the cognitive 
processes of generalization and discrimination. In this 
section, the relation between open-closed modifiers and 
dogmatism via generalization-discrimination will be explored.
Cognitive structures determine the way in which we 
view the world. Walter Lippmann (I966) in his now classic 
paper on stereotypes pointed out the fact that people develop 
cognitive categories which influence the way we perceive a 
subsequent and related event. He called these categories 
stereotypes;
The subtlest and most pervasive of all influences 
are those which create and maintain the repertory of 
stereotypes. We are told about the world before we 
see it. We imagine most things before we experience 
them. And those preconceptions, unless education has 
made us acutely_aware, govern deeply the whole process 
of perception /p. 72/.
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There is the suggestion here that language has much to do 
with the development of these stereotypes, a point which 
will be reinforced shortly.
There is no question but that stereotypes exist. 
Learning theorists may refer to them as habits or habit 
family hierarchies, and social psychologists may refer to 
them as sets, attitudes, or dispositions to respond, but 
by whatever name, they are structures which influence our 
perceptions of an event and our subsequent response to it.
These structures are developed with and influenced 
by language (Whorf, 1956). What we choose to focus on, 
both real and imaginary, in a given situation is partially 
a function of the way a given language substitutes for 
direct stimulation from the "real" world.
The specific nature of the mental transaction which 
occurs when a feature of grammar functions as stimuli is 
still unknown. Various theories have arisen attempting to 
account for the known facts. Osgood (1957) reviews several 
of these approaches and offers his own mediation hypothesis. 
In essence, a verbal sign becomes so, via contiguity with 
an established sign, when it can call forth a fraction 
(mediated) of the original response. The mediated response 
can then become conditioned to other and new responses.
This hypothesis goes far to explain how we come to learn 
language and to make new responses.
If we add Osgood»s evaluative assertion analysis to 
his mediation hypothesis, an explanation of the development
lô
of structure begins to emerge. In brief, the meaning of a 
given relation is the result of the interaction of the 
mediating responses of connected signs. These connections 
are associative (belonging) or dissociative (difference) 
types. Given a connection between a "good" and President 
Nixon, made either by verbal assertion or by some act 
considered "good" which was performed by Nixon, the inter­
action of the separate mediating responses when connected 
produces a new cognitive category, a new structure.
Osgood (1957) says that if such connections are 
repeated, they will, like any other learning response, tend 
to become stable connections. In this manner, new cate­
gories can be developed and related in network and 
hierarchical fashion. The empirical evidence reported with 
the theories supports their analysis.
It is assumed here that the learning of any feature 
of grammar can be explained by Osgood’s constructs.
Insofar as the obligatory features of grammar are concerned, 
the developing cognitive structures should be relatively 
similar across persons within a given language community. 
Otherwise communication would be virtually impossible.
The variable features of grammar interacting with 
individual experiences provides some reason to expect 
greater structural variability among persons. Such differ­
ences should be relatively small when the structures were 
developed with signs representative of the real world; the
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major differences in cognitive structures should exist as 
a result of interacting signs, at least one of which is 
exclusively subjective, i.e., good water, tall people, 
strong and active athlete, etc.
These are unique structures, but Osgood (1957) 
reports that in such combinations the adjective is dominant. 
For example, the adjective "good" dominates the noun "water," 
Cliff (1959) reports that adverb-adjective combinations 
function multiplicatively. Bowers (1964) found that language 
intensity was correlated (r - .09) with the presence of 
qualifiers such as most, and least. Howe (1962) predicted 
a correlation relation of adverbs and adjectives (r = .967) 
when the adverbs were probabilistic; a correlation (r = .999) 
was achieved when both intensity and probabilistic adverbs 
were used. Lilly (1966a; 1966b) replicated the multiplica­
tive function of adverb-adjective combinations and 
demonstrated that it held for the potency dimension as well 
as the activity and evaluative ones.
All of these studies were concerned with the effect 
of modification of one sign by another. All of them relate 
also to matters of degree; they are not categorical. The 
product of these interacting signs should be_ quite different 
across individuals because of the problems of degree and 
strictly subjective categories. Within limits, these 
individual differences can be ascribed to differences in 
individual abilities to discriminate. The greater the
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individual ability to make distinctions, the more refined 
these structures should be. A poor ability to discriminate 
should produce structures with few distinctions.
Although there can be large differences in cognitive 
structures across individuals, there is some evidence which 
suggests that within an individual there is a similarity of 
mediated structures. Rokeach (I960) upholds the notion that 
humans have belief-disbelief systems. He specifically points 
out that an individual's belief-disbelief systems relate to a 
general cognitive structure; that belief-disbelief systems 
are topic-free. An individual, for example, who tends to be 
closed-minded about race, would, according to Rokeach, also 
tend to be closed-minded about religion, education, and 
government.
Baron (1965) reported a study which makes a similar 
assumption about cognitive structure within an individual.
He divided subjects into groups on the basis of an assimil- 
ation-differentiation continuum. He found significant 
differences between the two groups in attitude change and 
recall; but the point of interest here is that some minds 
tend to assimilate with less discrimination than others. 
Baron's assimilators and differentiators are at least not 
unlike Rokeach's high and low dogmatic types, respectively.
A most challenging question now arises. Why do high 
dogmatic types develop tendencies to consistently assimilate 
many topics with little discrimination? Is it because the
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incoming stimuli are mediated by existing impoverished struc­
tures? Or, is there some general process which develops 
within each individual and somehow selectively controls which 
stimulus pattern interacts with which existing structures? 
Similar questions could be asked about open-minded people.
This paper cannot begin to answer these questions. 
However, regardless of whether there is some general process 
of generalization-discrimination, or whether the generaliza- 
tion-discrimination is inherent in Osgood’s mediation process, 
this paper assumes that it is an intervening variable, which 
is inherent in every mental interaction. This is consistent 
with the views of Rokeach and Baron relative to general 
mental tendencies. Somehow, between stimuli and existing 
cognitive structures, generalization and discrimination 
function to identify and relate content on the basis of 
belonging and difference relations.
Earlier in this paper, the grammatical features which 
indicate belonging and difference relations were specified, 
one of which was open-closed modification. By way of summary, 
modification has been demonstrated to be very important to 
the meaning of a given message. Open-closed modification is 
one syntactical device which attempts to represent degree of 
relation. Since humans create some strictly subjective 
categories and place judgements on virtually every stimulus; 
and since both of these general problems involve the problem 
of degree, open-closed modification should bear some relation 
to one’s generalization-discrimination abilities.
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If high dogmatic types are somewhat deficient in 
discrimination, they should tend to be less aware of degrees 
involved in relations; and low dogmatic types should be more 
sensitive to degrees. Given this assumption, it would be 
reasonable to expect high dogmatic people to encode more 
relations which are closed inclusively or exclusively with 
closing-type modification; and low dogmatic types should 
encode more relations qualified by opening-type modifications. 
There is some evidence for this view.
Kline (1970) found significant differences (p<\05) 
between high-low opinionated statements and stereotypy. It 
should be noted that Kline’s "opinionated" statements have 
a similarity to, but are not the same as the "opinionated 
and nonopinionated" statements of Rokeach (I960). Kline’s 
statements are expressions of belief, while Rokeach’s non­
opinionated statement is an expression of belief towards a 
topic, but his opinionated statement specifies an expression 
of belief for a given topic and a negative belief about those 
who are against it. Kline also found that high opinionated 
statements used more "allness" type terms than low opinion­
ated statements. The differences were in the predicted 
direction, but they were not significant at the p <̂ .05 level.
Cummings (1970) found that low dogmatic subjects 
significantly (p <T.001) encoded more subject words, limiters, 
and connectors than high dogmatic types. This relationship 
does not specify modification by the type conceptualized in
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this study; however, the tendency for low dogmatic subjects 
to use more limiters is consistent with the expectation here, 
as more limiters would be indicative of greater awareness of 
degrees.
Osgood (1955), Cliff (1959), Howe (1962; 1966), Lilly 
(1968a; 1968b), McEwen (1969) report results of studies about 
language intensity. The only relevance of these studies here 
is that they indicate the importance of modification to the 
meaning of a concept or message. A specific study of message 
intensity will be reported shortly which will illustrate the 
differing concepts of modification present in message inten­
sity ys the open-closed distinction being made here.
These studies on intensity and encoding behaviors 
have been for the most part descriptive in nature. They 
provide some, albeit meagre, empirical evidence to suggest 
that there are relations between syntax and encoding behavior, 
However, communication researchers are interested in effects 
of messages upon receivers in decoding positions. A few 
studies have attempted to study syntax on decoding behaviors.
Bowers (1963) studied the effects of language inten­
sity on subjects differing in levels of social introversion 
on attitudes toward the topic and the source. Of six 
hypotheses, only one reached significance at the p<^.05 
level; he found that the extrovert group changed their 
attitudes toward the message topic more than a middle group, 
and the middle group changed more than the introverted group. 
This finding, however, was the opposite of what he predicted.
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Kochevar (1967) studied the effects of message inten­
sity on the evaluation of the source, topic, and message.
No significant differences were found between high and low 
intensity messages upon the dependent variables. Kochevar*s 
study is similar in some respects to the experiment reported 
in this paper. Many of the modifiers used by Kochevar are 
the same as will be used in the messages prepared here; how­
ever, there are also many differences. Kochevar selects his 
subjects at random; there is no stratification into types as 
there is here. More important, message intensity and open- 
closed modification are conceptually and operationally 
different (a fact which applies equally well to the other 
intensity studies already reported). For example, in 
Kochevar*s high-low intensity messages can is rated as more 
intense than might. but neither word in context closes the 
category. In a similar manner, most is rated higher than 
many, but neither closes the content category.
Another important difference is that both high and 
low intensity messages of Kochevar contain many open-closing 
type modifications. For example, there are 16 open type 
modifiers which are the same in both messages, e.g., many 
people, generally believe, likelihood of infection, etc.
Also many closed modifications appear in both messages.
Under these circumstances, no test of the open-closed modi­
fication concept is possible.
Gerald Miller and Lobe (196?) reported a study about 
the effects of opinionated and nonopinionated statements on
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subjects of high and low dogmatic types and found no signif­
icant interaction of the two variables. In a follow-up study, 
Gerald Miller and Baseheart (1969) added credibility as a 
third independent variable, but still found no significance 
for variations in open- and closed-mindedness of receivers. 
Mehrley and McCroskey (1970) reported significant results 
using opinionated statements, credibility, and attitude inten­
sity as predictors of attitude changes. In each of these 
studies their (Rokeach type) opinionated vs nonopinionated 
statements do not correspond to the opening-closing modifi­
cation concept used in this study; for, opening and closing 
type modifications are used in both treatment conditions.
Their opinionated-nonopinionated statements probably relate 
more to the extra weight of added meaning to the content 
than to syntactical effect. Wiat they seem to be measuring 
is the effects of a message with 'strong belief type state­
ments concerning a given topic, ys the effects of a message 
with strong belief type statements concerning a topic 
combined with strong belief type statements about persons 
who are opposed to the position of the source.
In summary, the several studies reported here have 
provided some evidence to suggest that modification is 
important to meaning; that there may be important relations 
between syntax and encoding behavior; and that very little 
evidence exists concerning syntax and decoding behaviors.
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Hypotheses
The foregoing analysis would suggest that open- and 
closed-minded persons exhibit general differences in 
generalization-discrimination abilities. As a consequence, 
open-minded people are expected to be more sensitive to 
distinctions, to degrees of similarities and differences 
than closed-minded people. Open-closed type modification 
is one syntactical variable which represents degrees of 
similarities and differences. On this basis, the following 
predictions are made:
Hypothesis 1: The use of opening and closing type
modifications will have differential 
effects on the comprehension of sub­
jects rated as high and low dogmatic 
types.
Hypothesis 2: The use of opening and closing type
modifications will have differential 
effects on the source credibility 
ratings by high and low dogmatic 
types.
Hypothesis 3 : The use of opening and closing type
modifications will have differential 
effects on the attitudes of subjects 




In Chapter one, a rationale was developed for 
expecting opening-closing type modification to interact 
with high and low dogmatic types. High, and low dogmatic 
types were shown to have differing discrimination abilities. 
Discrimination was shown to be related to matters of degree. 
Opening-closing modification is one syntactical device which 
represents degrees. This chapter develops the procedures, 
variables, design, manipulation checks, and method of data 
analysis used in testing the possible interaction of opening- 
closing modifications with high and low dogmatic receivers.
Procedures
Subjects. Two samples of subjects (N = 162) and 
(N = 129) were selected from the basic course in Speech Com­
munication at the University of Oklahoma, Spring, 1971. The
large sample (N = 162) was used only for selecting the 
experimental topic. Generalizability of the results of this 
experiment conducted on the second sample (N = 129) is tech­
nically limited to the statements about the population from 
which they have been selected, i.e., students in the basic 
course in Speech Communication.
Sampling procedure. On the basis of the Powell-Troldahl 
(1965) dogmatic test, subjects (N = 129) were divided on the
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basis of a median split into high and low dogmatic groups. 
Within the high and low groups, each subject was randomly- 
assigned to either a pretest or unpretest condition. Sub­
jects were then subdivided by random assignment to either 
the open, closed, or control conditions.
Testing procedure. The attitudes of subjects (N = 162) 
were measured on five topics for the purpose of selecting one 
topic which best represented a theoretic distribution. The 
topic selected on this basis was "Church Involvement in 
Politics," The descriptive statistics for this judgement 
are listed in Appendix A,
The attitudes of the subjects designated to receive 
pretests were measured on the experimental topic along with 
two others not of interest here. One week later, the sub­
jects were given one of the two "modified" messages, both 
attributed to the same source. Control subjects were given 
a message unrelated to the treatment message. Immediately 
following the reading of the message, the subject answered 
questions testing his comprehension of the message; took an 
attitude measure on the message source, and a second attitude 
measure on the message proposition. A debriefing session 
followed the experiment.
Independent Variables
Dogmatism. Stratification into high and low dogmatic 
types was necessary to test the interaction hypothesis of
29
syntax and dogmatism. The 20-item Powell-Troldahl (1965) 
dogmatism scale is shorter and more efficient, with little 
loss in reliability, than the original 44 item test of 
Rokeach (I960).
Open modification of the content classes of the 
message. The content of any message is grammatically 
arranged in terms of classes. For this study, the content 
classes of a message are operationalized as (1) subjects, 
objects, predicates, and (2) any modification which repre­
sents an inherent characteristic of a subject, object, or 
predicate; e.g., in "the red book is on the top shelf of 
the bookcase," "red" is a modification representing an 
inherent characteristic of the class content "book," while 
"top" and "of the bookcase" are modifications which point 
to the book’s spatial position.
Opening type modification is herein operationalized 
as any word, phrase, or clause which qualifies the content 
being emphasized at a given point in the message; further, 
that such qualification should function to keep the content 
classes and their specified relations open. In other words, 
it must alert the receiver that the content relations being 
discussed are in some way matters of degree. An example 
can be more specific:
A. President Nixon favors revenue-sharing.
B. Nixon generally favors revenue-sharing.
C. Nixon favors most aspects of revenue-sharing.
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In sentence A, there is no open-type modification. 
Nixon is modified by "President" but that modification is 
not expressive of degree. The belonging relations: Nixon-
to-President, and Nixon-to-revenue-sharing are stated as 
absolutes. The relations, syntactically, do not admit of 
degree.
In sentence B, the belonging relation of Nixon-to- 
revenue- sharing is qualified in such a manner as to 
indicate that the "favoring" is a matter of degree; that 
is, he likes some aspects better than he likes other aspects 
of it.
Sentence C indicates that the favoring relation is 
now limited to some aspects of revenue-sharing; i.e., 
revenue-sharing is no longer inclusively related to favor­
ing; some exception has been made, but the exception is a 
matter of degree since the boundary reduction is nonspecific. 
This sentence implies that at least one aspect of revenue- 
sharing is not favored by Nixon.
Closed modification of the content classes of the 
message. Closing type modification is operationalized as 
any word, phrase, or clause which functions to close the 
content and specified relations either inclusively, or 
exclusively. For example:
A. Nixon gives his full support to revenue-sharing.
B, There is no doubt about Nixon»s recent drop in 
popularity.
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In sentence A, "full” is the word which closes the 
belonging relation of "Nixon-to-revenue-sharing"; no matter 
of degree is implied in the relation. In sentence B, the 
phrase "there is no doubt" closes the matter to further 
consideration.
The messages in both treatment conditions are the 
same except for their respective modification differences. 
Both messages contain exactly the same number of words.
For every closed modification, there is an open one; and, 
in most cases the number of words for each change is 
exactly the same in both conditions. In a few cases, this 
wasn’t possible. The separate messages are in Appendix B.
Dependent Variables
Three dependent variables were used in this study: 
comprehension, source credibility, and attitudes.
Comprehension. A 20-item multiple-choice test over 
the message material was prepared and given to determine 
how much of the message content was understood by the sub­
jects, The last item was not scored for comprehension; it 
was used as a check upon the strength of the messages. The 
test placed primary emphasis upon the subject’s ability to 
discriminate degrees of meaning written into the message. 
Since the comprehension test was not a standardized one, 
the raw scores were corrected for chance factors using the 
following a priori scoring formula (Guilford, 1954)î
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S = R - W
K-i
S = corrected score, R = number of right answers, W * number 
of wrong ansers, and K = number of alternatives available.
These corrected posttest scores were subjected to a 
2 X 2  factorial analysis of variance testing the treatment 
effect on this variable (Winer, 1962). The comprehension 
test is included in Appendix B.
Credibility. A semantic differential having five 
bi-polar scales was used to measure the credibility of the 
message source. They were: good-bad, friendly-unfriendly,
reasonable-unreasonable, expert-inexpert, and tolerant- 
intolerant. All of these scales except two were selected 
from the factor analytic studies of McCroskey (1966). 
Tolerant-intolerant, reasonable-unreasonable, the exceptions, 
were chosen because of their intuitive appropriateness to 
the treatments used here. This procedure has some precedence 
(Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum, 1957; Sereno (1968). In both 
of these cases some scales were chosen intuitively.
As was noted earlier, credibility is considered a 
powerful variable. It was felt that a source high in cred­
ibility with the subjects might be strong enough to reduce 
the effect of the treatment. For this reason, the subjects 
were told that the source of the message is a college stu­
dent at the University of Oklahoma majoring in philosophy. 
Philosophy was selected in an attempt to provide the subject
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with an initial impression that the source was objective or 
at least not known to be prejudiced about the topic. Post­
test scores were then subjected to a 2 X 2 factorial analysis 
of variance.
Attitudes. A semantic differential having five bi-polar 
scales was used to pretest the attitudes of the subjects on 
the experimental topic and two others. The scales used were: 
good-bad, foolish-wise, beneficial-harmful, unfair-fair, and 
worthless-valuable (McCroskey, 1966). The same scales were 
used in the posttest measurement of subjects* attitudes 
toward the message topic. The difference scores were then 
subjected to a 2 X 2 factorial analysis of variance.
Design
A modified Solomon (1949) group design was used in 
this experiment. Its specific components are:
^1: pretest, open modification, posttest
^2:________  open modification, posttest
1̂: pretest, ________________, posttest
2̂:   , posttest
^1: pretest, closed modification, posttest
2̂:   closed modification, posttest
This design functions to provide external validity 
checks upon any significant effect that might be obtained. 
Specifically, effects are controlled for history, matura­
tion, test sensitizing, and pretest— treatment interaction
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sources of variance (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). The com­
parisons made for these controls will be specified under 
manipulation checks.
Manipulation Checks
The sampling procedures produced the following hier­
archy of cells:
CiBiAx(Hi, closed,pretest ) (Lo, dosed,pretest )C2 Ax=Solomon y^
C^B^AxtHi,closed,______ )(Lo,closed,______ )C2B2Ax= " y 2
CiBiAy(Hi,open,pretest) ( Lo, open, pretest ) C2BiAy= " X],
CiBiAy(Hi,open,______ ) (Lo,open,_______) C2B2Ay= " %2
CiBiAz(Hi,control,pretest)(Lo,control,pretest)C2BiAz= "
CiB2Az( Hi, control,______ )(Lo,control,  )C2E%Az= " %2
Ax and Ay represent the closed and open treatment groups 
respectively. Az stands for control, B̂  and B2 are pretest and 
no pretest conditions respectively, and C^ and C2 are high and 
low dogmatic types respectively. For all individual cells 
(n = 10); combining the two cells across each row produces the 
data cells for the Solomon design.
Campbell & Stanley (1963) recommends a 2 X 2 factorial 
analysis of variance for controlling extraneous variance 
related to this design. Since the Solomon design here w^s 
applied to two independent variables, two 2 X 2  factorial 
analyses of variance were computed:
Closed Modification Condition
no X X







(All cells are given Solomon labels)
The main effect of x (and y) is a test of the treat­
ment effect. The main effect of pretest-unpretest is a 
control for history and pretest sensitizing effect. The 
interaction of x— no-x and pretest— no pretest serves as a 
control for testing and treatment interactions.
Analysis of Data
Since the manipulation checks did not produce any 
significant differences due to extraneous variables, the data 
was collapsed into a 2 X 2 factorial analysis of variance.





The 2 X 2  analysis of variance was repeated for each dependent 
variable. The primary research hypothesis is one of inter­
action for each dependent variable, credibility, comprehension, 
and attitudes:
H^: Closing and opening modification conditions will
result in differential effects upon high and low 
dogmatic receivers (p<.05; two tail; Ho:
«1=M2=M3=»4)
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Although the interaction hypotheses did not achieve 
significance, all main effects were tested for differences.
Had the data warranted it, comparison of simple effects would 
have been carried out. Based on the notion that high dogmatic 
subjects are less discriminating than low dogmatic subjects, 
the following secondary research hypotheses were made:
Comprehension
Main effect
H2: Levels of dogmatism will produce significant
differences in message comprehension, 
(CiAy-j-CiAx ̂ CgAy-f G2AX at p<.05, two tail)
Credibility
Simple effect
Hg: Low dogmatics receiving the open treatment
will rate the source higher than low dogmatic 
subjects receiving the closed treatment, 
(C2Ay^C2Ax, p<^05, one tail)
Ho ; High dogmatics in both treatment conditions 




Hg; Levels of dogmatism will produce significant 
differences in attitude changes.
(C2Ay-f C2AX * CiAy-fCiAx at p<^.05, two tail)
Linear combination comparison
Ĥ : Low dogmatics in the open condition will make
greater favorable change than all other groups, 
(C2Ay>C2Ax, C^Ay, C^Ax at p <10$, one tail)
A student's t-test (Winer, 1962) was selected for 
testing the a priori comparisons; the ones specified here
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are those which would appear to support the research hypoth­
esis if the results are in the predicted direction.
A Scheffe’s t-test (Kirk, 1969) was selected to test 
any post hoc comparisons warranted by inspection of the data.
This chapter has presented the necessary pre- and post- 
experimental procedures. Pretest and posttest booklets are 




This study examined the effects of open-closed type 
modification upon comprehension, credibility, and attitudes 
of high and low dogmatic receivers. The main research 
hypotheses predicted interaction between the syntactical and 
dogmatism variables. In addition, a few secondary hypotheses 
were made. By way of review, all hypotheses are repeated 
here by dependent variables.
Comprehension
The use of opening and closing type modifica­
tions will have differential effects on the 
comprehension of the subjects rated as high 
and low dogmatic types.
H2: Levels of dogmatism will produce significant
differences in message comprehension.
Credibility
The use of opening and closing type modifica­
tions will have differential effects on the 
source credibility ratings by high and low 
dogmatic types.
: High dogmatics in both treatment conditions
will rate the message source equally.
Attitudes
The use of opening and closing type modifica­
tions will have differential effects on the 
attitudes of subjects rated as high and low 
dogmatic types.
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Hg: Levels of dogmatism will produce significant
differences in attitude changes.
Low dogmatics in the open condition will make 
greater favorable attitude change than all 
other groups.
Results
Topic selection. Church involvement in politics, 
college student protests, and the candidacies of Richard 
Nixon, Edmund Muskie, and Fred Harris were the five topics 
selected for pretesting in the first stage of the experiment. 
The purpose was to select the one topic having the best 
theoretic distribution. Church involvement in politics 
appeared to have the better distribution. The other topics 
were either more skewed or peaked (see Figures 1 through 5). 
Further descriptive statistics supporting this conclusion 
are listed in Appendix A.
Subject attrition. Subjects (N = 129) took the 
dogmatism test. Of these, eleven were lost due to absences, 
and four due to incomplete answers. The test data of the 
remaining subjects (N = 106) was accepted for analysis.
Reliability manipulations. The Solomon controls for 
both the closed (N = 61) and open (N = 60) conditions provides 
support for significant treatment effects uncontaminated by 
extraneous variables. Tables 1 and 2 report significant 
effects for both the open and closed conditions. No signif­
icant pretest-unpretest effects, or pretest-treatment—  
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TABLE 1 
Analysis of Variance 
Closed Treatment: Test with Solomon Controls
Source df ss ms F
Between 3 30.5559 10.1853
Test condition 1 .5228 .5228 .1810
Treatment condition 1 24.3887 24.3887 8.4445**
Test by treatment 1 5.6444 5.6444 1.9543




Analysis of Variance 
Open Treatment: Test with Solomon Controls
Source df ss ms F
Between 3 19.2769 6.4256
Test condition 1 .1503 .1503 .0552
Treatment condition 1 11.7765 11.7765 4.3313*
Test by treatment 1 7.3501 7.3501 2.7033




As a second manipulation check, an analysis of variance 
of the pretest attitude scores was made. This was done to be 
sure that the groups weren't significantly different in their 
pre-treatment attitudes towards the topic. The results of 
this analysis are reported in Table 3. There were no signif­
icant differences on these pretest scores.
TABLE 3 
Analysis of Variance 
Pretest Attitude Scores
Source df ss ms F
Between 3 23.1039 7.7013
Dogmatism 1 .02 64 .8264 .1749
Treatment 1 6.2046 6.2046 1.3134
Dogmatism by 
treatment 1 16.0729 16.0729 3.4023
Within 34 160.6160 4.7240
Total 37 183.7199
A check was made to see if the subjects would perceive 
the messages as being different in terms of strength and 
reasonableness. Item 20 of the comprehension test asked the 
subjects to respond to the overall tone of the message by 
selecting one of six alternatives relating to message "strength" 
and "reasonableness" (individually and in combinations).
Of 35 subjects receiving the closed treatment, 60% rated 
the message as strong, and 40% rated it as mild. Of the 34
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subjects in the open treatment, rated the message as 
strong, and only 26% rated it as mild.
Of the 35 subjects in the closed condition, S0% chose
an alternative declaring the message reasonable, 11% said it 
was unreasonable, and nine % selected an alternative that did 
not contain the "reasonable" dimension. Of the 34 subjects 
in the open condition, 79% said it was reasonable, 15% said
it was unreasonable, and six % selected an alternative which
did not contain the "reasonable" dimension. In general, both 
messages were perceived by the subjects as equally reasonable, 
but they rated the open message as being.somewhat stronger 
than the closed one.
Comprehension. The corrected-for-chance scores of the 
experimental subjects (N = 66) were subjected to a 2 X 2 
analysis of variance. The analysis produced no significant 
results as can be seen in Table 4»
TABLE 4 
Analysis of Variance 
Comprehension
Source df ss ms F
Between 3 .9947 .3316
Dogmatism 1 .8610 .8610 1.1696
Treatment 1 .1176 .1176 .1597
Dogmatism by 
treatment 1 .0161 .0161 .0218
Within 64 47.1104 .7361
Total 67 48.1051
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The primary hypothesis was not supported since the treatment 
and dogmatism variables showed no significant interaction.
The main effects hypothesis on levels of dogmatism also failed 
to achieve significance.
Credibility. The credibility scores (N = 6è) were sub­
jected to a 2 X 2 analysis of variance. The results are 
reported in Table 5. No significant differences were found.
TABLE 5 
Analysis of Variance 
Credibility
Source df ss ms F
Between 3 4.4366 1.4789
Dogmatism 1 1.6972 1.6972 1.0137
Treatment 1 1.6366 1.6366 .9775
Dogmatism by 
treatment 3 1.1028 1.028 .6587
Within 64 107.1488 1.6742
Total 67 111.5854
The interaction hypothesis also was not supported and, as a 
consequence, the simple effect hypothesis was not tested.
Attitudes. The pretest-posttest attitude difference 
scores were subjected to a 2 X 2 analysis of variance.
Table 6 reports the results of this analysis. There were no 
significant results for the three attitude hypotheses.
TABLE 6 
Analysis of Variance 
Attitude Change
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Source df ss ms F
Between 3 28.1637 9.3879
Dogmatism 1 .0047 .0047 .0011
Treatment 1 18.3273 18.3273 4.4088*
Dogmatism by 
treatment 1 9.3317 9.8317 2.3651
Within 34 141.3246 4.1569
Total 37 169.4883
^Significant at p<;%05.
The only effect achieving significance came from the open- 
closed treatment main effect. The closing type modification 
condition created greater favorable change in the subject 
than did the open condition, although both were significant 
compared to the control groups.
Discussion
The rationale for this study suggested that open-minded 
subjects should be more sensitive to words representing degrees 
than closed-minded subjects. The subsequent expectation was 
that there would be significant differences between levels of 
dogmatism and message comprehension, source credibility, and 
attitude changes. In each case, however, the interaction 
hypothesis failed to achieve the predicted level of significance.
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This failure appears to be due simply to the failure 
of dogmatism to function as a control variable. Any inter­
action hypothesis in essence is a prediction that a correlation 
exists between the treatment and control variable. A failure 
to find such a correlation would be consistent with the func­
tional failure of a control variable. A calculation on 
dogmatism as a control for each dependent variable did not 
produce any significant correlations between the variables.
This is strong evidence of the failure of dogmatism, at least 
as measured by the scales used here, to function as a control 
variable.
The findings here are consistent with Gerald Miller & 
Lobe {1967) and Gerald Miller & Baseheart (1969). They also 
failed to achieve significant interaction of treatment and 
the credibility ratings of open- and closed-minded receivers 
(they did find an interaction between opinionatedness and 
credibility of receivers).
This consistency, however, is limited somewhat by the 
differences in treatment and rationale between their studies 
and this one. Their studies used opinionated nonopinionated 
statements; this study used open-closed modification. T^eir 
studies had a "social reinforcement" rationale, while this one 
had a language-discrimination one.
The Mehrley & McCroskey (1970) study also has one 
relation relevant to the findings here. They failed to find 
any interaction between opinionated— nonopinionated statements
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and credibility. The finding is again limited by the same 
differences noted relative to the Gerald Miller studies.
In addition, Mehrley & McCroskey didn't distinguish between 
open- and closed-minded receivers.
Bowers (1963) also failed to achieve significance for 
his hypothesized interaction between language intensity and 
levels of social introversions on credibility. To the extent 
that introversion levels can be seen as related to open- and 
closed-mindedness, that is the extent the finding would be 
relevant here. It is at least not inconsistent with the 
finding here.
There is some reason to believe that an interaction 
hypothesis of language treatment and dogmatism might occur 
if attitude intensity were to become a third independent 
variable. Bettinghaus (1966) suggests that intensity of 
appeal, which as operationalized has some relation to the 
language conditions here, will interact differentially with 
the subject's previous intensity of attitude toward the 
message topic. The Mehrley & McCroskey (1970) study supports 
this principle. They found that subjects having initially 
neutral and intense attitudes, when exposed to different 
levels of "opinionatedness," did change their attitudes 
differentially.
All of this is by way of suggesting that the dogmatism 
variable may yet prove to be a useful distinction to make with 
language variables.
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The treatment conditions produced significant attitude 
change but no significant differences in credibility scores. 
These results suggest that the scores on attitude change and 
source credibility would not be correlated. Calculations 
indicate this to be the case; no significant correlation was 
found between them.
The question of why the treatment produced differences 
in attitude change, but not in credibility remains to be 
answered.
The congruity principle (Osgood, Suci, & Tannenhaum, 
1957) would suggest that the credibility and attitude scores 
should be correlated. In this case, however, it has been 
pointed out that no such correlation exists. An alternative 
explanation is that the source was perceived as an unimportant 
peer; and, that somehow the message failed to generate any 
strong feelings about him either way.
An interesting question remains. Why did the closed 
treatment produce significantly greater and more favorable 
attitude change? Did the closed treatment produce the stronger 
message? McGuire (1965) pointed out that there was a slight 
tendency for less intense messages to produce more attitude 
change than messages high in intensity. This is consistent 
with the findings here. The closed treatment was more effec­
tive, but the open treatment was rated as the stronger message. 
Hence, strength of the message per se apparently is not the 
reason for the differing effects.
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A possible explanation for the treatment effects 
relates to the rationale for this study. Perhaps the closing 
type modification with its stress on inclusive-exclusive 
relationships may have interfered in some way with the dis­
crimination processes causing the subjects to accept the 
gross generalizations rather uncritically. On the other hand, 
the open condition with its emphasis on degrees of relation­
ships may have produced a mental state of uncertainty relative 
to the message arguments. This "uncertainty" then might 
explain the lesser amounts of attitude change.
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Chapter IV
Summary and Suggestions for Further Study
This study hypothesized that open and closing type 
modifications would differentially affect the comprehension, 
credibility, and attitude scores of subjects rated as high 
and low dogmatic types. This expectation was based on the 
belief that open-minded subjects would be more sensitive to 
word structures expressive of "degrees" of relations than 
would closed-minded subjects. The results of this experiment 
did not support any of these interaction hypotheses.
The treatment effect on the attitude change variable 
was the only effect achieving significance. Both treatment 
conditions produced significant attitude changes. The closed 
treatment, however, produced significantly greater attitude 
changes than did the open treatment. The results of this 
study lend support to the findings of previous research that 
dogmatism is not a useful control variable.
This study and others raise several important issues. 
The primary one would seem to be the use of dogmatism as a 
control variable. None of the communication studies have 
achieved significant results using the dogmatism distinction. 
This could be due to many factors. Perhaps the dogmatism 
scales aren't really measuring open- and closed-mindedness. 
Another possibility is that the college student populations
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are not representative of the kinds of closed-minded persons 
found in the general population of a given culture.
A second issue concerns dogmatism and comprehension.
The results of the analysis on these variables here were in 
the predicted direction but were not significant. Since this 
study used a nonstandardized comprehension test, it is possible 
that the results were due more to the weaknesses of the instru­
ment than to dogmatism.
The use of only one topic and one source in the exper­
iment also may have influenced the results. The topic and 
message source may not have been important enough to the 
subjects to produce the expected interactions. Many other 
studies have demonstrated credibility effects by manipulating 
different sources. Varying the levels of credibility might 
then produce credibility effects with the open-closed treatment 
conditions as used in this study. The same reasoning would 
appear to apply to the manipulation of topics to be used in 
such experiments.
Another issue here concerns the treatment effect. The 
closed treatment with its inclusive-exclusive generalizations 
produced the greater attitude change. Intuitively, one would 
expect intelligent, open-minded subjects to notice the gross­
ness of those generalizations and subsequently be less 
influenced by them. By the same reasoning, one would expect 
intelligent subjects to notice the careful qualification of
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the conclusions in the open treatment condition, and sub­
sequently be more impressed with the message and the source.
This reasoning was not supported. To the contrary, 
it appeared as though the word structures, which made the 
conclusions extremely rigid, somehow interfered with the 
discrimination processes; and that the open treatment func­
tioned to create more doubt in the subject*s belief about 
the topic. If this notion has any value to it, the possi­
bility of inhibiting discrimination processes with nondis­
criminating syntactical structures arises. Conversely, the 
possibility of creating doubt with the syntactically more 
precise description of objects and relations is equally 
interesting.
A final issue to be raised here concerns the relative 
effectiveness of the open-closed modification, the opinionated-- 
nonopinionated, and the language intensity concepts. This 
study assumed that differences among them did exist, and the 
results appear to support the value of such a distinction.
The discussion of these issues suggests a number of 
recommendations for a continued program of research.
First, before concluding that the dogmatism distinction 
is of no value, it should be tested with a random sample from 
a larger population. Such studies are difficult and expensive, 
but they can be done. An alternative would be to run tests 
with populations which include only the extremenly high or lovf 
dogmatic types. It would be quite valuable to communication
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researchers to learn how members of the John Birch Society, 
Minutemen, Weathermen, Ku Klux Klan, etc., and others would 
respond to specified open-closed type word structures. A 
third and easier alternative would be to do the same thing 
but with college students. The generalizability of the 
results would be severely limited, but still useful to the 
communicator who may need to communicate with such select 
audiences.
Second, the treatment effect raises the need for at 
least three specific studies. A direct test concerning the 
relations between the encoding and decoding behaviors of 
subjects on the open-closing variables might prove valuable.
A similar test with young children might provide insights 
concerning the best word structures to use in developing 
greater open-mindedness. A direct test of the open-closed 
concept against nonopinionated— opinionated language, and 
language intensity is also recommended.
A final recommendation here would be to replicate 
this study with additional variables. An extensive research 
effort is necessary to determine what personality variables 
are correlated with attitude change. Obviously, dogmatism 
provided no control. To obtain a more sophisticated theory 
of attitude change based on treatment effects, we must obtain 
that relevant descriptive data which builds theories. 
Collectively, the results of these proposals should tell us 
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High Low Mean Variance SoD. Skew,
College Student Protests 35 5 21.04 47.14, 6.86 -.41*
Church Involvement in Politics 35 5 17.11 47.47 6.88 .20
Candidacy of Richard Nixon 35 5 23.03 50.29 ! 7.09 -. 69*
Candidacy of Edmund Muskie 35 5 23.13 39.68 6.29 -.56*
Candidacy of Fred Harris 3^ 5 22.77 169.95 13.03 5.92*
Dogmatism Scores 99 22 64.73 47.14 12.96 .05
Comprehension Scores 16.34 -1 7.20 12.12 3.48 .03
Credibility Scores 35 12 24.37 28.15 5.31 .16
Pretest Attitude Scores 35 5 15.95 52.05 7.21 .55
Posttest Attitude Scores 
^Significant at p^.05 level
35 5 20.03 53.22 7.29 .19
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University of Oklahoma 
Norman, Oklahoma
PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 
(Gollege-University)
Name
Sex Social Security or 
Student Number








The University of Oklahoma’s Department of Speech Communication 
Research Laboratory is conducting an exploratory study on personal and 
social opinions. This test booklet has several short blocks or groups 
of questions which are essential in the carrying out of this project. 
Please remember there are no right or wrong answers. You are 
asked to give your frank and honest opinions at this time. The 
University administration is not sponsoring this survey, and neither 
the administration, the instructor, nor anyone not associated with the 
research laboratory will have usage of this information. We ask for 
your name, et. al., for identifying purposes only. Your anonymity is 
guaranteed. At a later date, a University of Oklahoma research staff 
member will return to answer any questions you might have about the 
project.
Please do not open this booklet until you have received appro­
priate instructions from the project leader. Thank you for your 
cooperation.
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We are interested now in what the general public thinks 
and feels about a number of important social and personal 
questions. The best answer to each statement below is your 
personal opinion. We have tried to cover many different and 
opposing points of view; you may find yourself agreeing strongly 
with some of the statements, disagreeing just as strongly with 
others, and perhaps uncertain about others; whether you agree 
or disagree with any statement, you can be sure that many 
people feel the same as you do.
Mark each statement in the left margin according to how 
much you agree or disagree with it. Please mark every one.
Write +1, +2, f3, or -1, -2, -3, depending on how you feel in 
each case.
+1: I AGREE A LITTLE -1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
f2: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
f3 : I AGREE VERY MUCH -3 : I DISAGREE VERY MUCH
Please write both the number and the sign in the margin 
left of each statement:
  The United States and Russia have just about nothing in
common.
  It is often desirable to reserve judgement about what's
going on until one has had a chance to hear the opinions 
of those one respects.
  Man on his own is a helpless and miserable creature.
  In this complicated world of ours the only way we can know
what’s going on is to rely on leaders or experts who can 
be trusted.
  I'd like it if I could find someone who would tell me how
to solve my personal problems.
  The highest form of government is a democracy and the
highest form of democracy is a government run by those 
who are most intelligent.
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While I don't like to admit this even to myself, my secret 
ambition is to become a great man, like Einstein, or 
Beethoven, or Shakespeare.
The present is all too often full of unhappiness. It is 
only the future that counts.
Continue marking your answers in this manner:
41: I AGREE A LITTLE -1: I DISAGREE A LITTLE
42: I AGREE ON THE WHOLE -2: I DISAGREE ON THE WHOLE
+3 : I AGREE VERY MUCH -3 : I DISAGREE VERY MUCH
To compromise with our political opponents is dangerous 
because it usually leads to betrayal of our own side.
It is only when a person devotes himself to an ideal or 
cause that life becomes meaningful.
Most people just don't give a "damn" for others.
The main thing in life is for a person to want to do -c ■
something important.
Most people just don't know what's good for them.
Even though freedom of speech for all groups is a worth­
while goal, it is unfortunately necessary to restrict 
the freedom of certain political groups.
In a discussion I often find it necessary to repeat myself 
several times to make sure I am being understood.
Most of the ideas which get printed nowadays aren't worth 
the paper they are printed on.
It is better to be a dead hero than to be a live coward.
My blood boils whenever a person stubbornly refuses to 
admit he's wrong.
There.are two kinds of people in this world: those who
are for the truth and those who are against the truth.
Of all the different philosophies which exist in this 
world there is probably only one which is correct.
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Do not write PRETEST OF ATTITUDES
in this space ON THE EXPERIMENTAL TOPIC
Subject No.__ University of Oklahoma 
Group No. __  Norman, Oklahoma





Sex  Social Security or
3 __  Student Number




The University of Oklahoma’s Department of Speech Communication 
Research Laboratory is conducting another exploratory study on personal 
and social opinions. This test booklet has several short blocks or 
groups of questions which are essential in the carrying out of this 
project.
Please remember there are no right or wrong answers. You 
are asked to give your frank and honest opinions at this time.
The University administration is not sponsoring this survey, and 
neither the administration, the instructor, nor anyone not associa­
ted with the research laboratory will have usage of this information.
We ask for your name, et. al., for identifying purposes only.
Your anonymity is guaranteed. At a later date, a University of 
Oklahoma research staff member will return to answer any questions 
you might have about the project.
Please do not open this booklet until you have received 
appropriate instructions from the project leader. Thank you for 
your cooperation.
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On this page there are three semantic differentials, 
a type of attitude scale. Evaluate the concept at the top 
of each semantic differential in terms of the bi-polar 
adjectives below the concept. For example, if you were to 
evaluate the concept "liquor by the drink" in terms of its 
effect, and you think it is unhealthy, you would mark an X 
as below:
Liquor by the Drink
Good: : X_: Bad
If you feel that it is quite healthy, of course your X would 
be placed nearer to the healthy pole.
The middle space should be considered "neutral."
Check this space if you feel that neither adjective applies 
to the concept, or if you feel both adjectives apply equally 
to the concept.
Please answer all items and make only one check mark 
on each scale.
*******************


































MESSAGE TREATMENTS AND POSTTEST MEASURES
Do not write 
in this space
Subject No.___
Test 1___  PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY (college) #3
 2___  Name _________________________




The University of Oklahoma’s Department of Speech Com­
munication Research Laboratory is conducting another study on 
personal and social opinions. This test booklet has several 
short blocks or groups of questions which are essential in the 
carrying out of this project.
Please remember there are ho right or wrong answers.
You are asked to give your frank and honest opinions at this 
time. Again, the University administration is not sponsoring 
this survey, and neither the administration, the instructor, 
nor anyone not associated with the research laboratory will 
have usage of this information.
Next week, a University of Oklahoma research staff • 
member will return to answer any questions you might have 
about the project.
Please do not open this booklet until you have received 
appropriate instructions from the project leader. Thanks very 
much for your help.
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CLOSED MODIFICATION MESSAGE
On this and the following pages is a statement prepared 
as an introduction to a forum group gathered to discuss the 
church in modern society. It was prepared and presented by an 
OU student majoring in philosophy.
It has been observed that a church is more than buildings, 
ministers, deacons, and congregations. A church like that which 
Jesus Christ spoke of is a living, breathing spirit of love, 
hope, and charity. Such a church would be alive to the moral 
quandaries, the personal and political problems of modern man.
There are no differences now between moral and political 
problems. For example, Vietnam is a war whose origin was com­
pletely political. It was the complete and absolute refusal of 
the United States to allow the unifying elections— which had 
been agreed to in the 1954 Geneva Agreements— that undoubtedly 
precipitated our military involvement there. Everyone who is 
knowledgeable in history now, without the slightest inkling of 
reservation, believes that the war is a tragic mistake. The 
only remaining argument is over what is the better way of getting 
out.
Vietnam is not exclusively a political problem; it is 
just as fully a moral one as well. Bright, young men wrestle 
daily with their consciences over the moral dilemma of how to 
be loyal to one’s country and yet satisfy one’s belief against 
killing in an undeniably immoral war.
IVhat have the churches done for these men faced with 
great moral crises? Officially, they have done absolutely 
nothing. Not a single church or council of churches has openly 
supported or denounced the war. Not one has adopted an official 
policy of advising young men either to refuse to serve or, to 
serve with God’s blessing.
Our churches preach love of fellowman, unselfishness, 
tolerance, etc. In contrast to what is taught, the young of 
our nation see the political system repressing the rights of 
minority groups; see that the market place is dominated com­
pletely by greed; see that material wealth— not love, tolerance, 
unselfishness, or humanity— is the basis of power in government. 
They see a system which pays in the billions to farmers for not 
producing or, to buy and store at inflated prices what is pro­
duced while money to feed impoverished families, to fight 
pollution, to aid medical research, and to help education is so 
cautiously given that it is never enough for any single one of 
our needs. If someone must be paid for. doing nothing, the young 
wonder why we can’t spend as lavishly on other more serious 
problems.
Please turn the page and continue reading.
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The young face an environment threatened by pollution 
created exclusively by businessmen who always choose profit 
over pollution research. They see a government forbid tele­
vision advertising about smoking, due to the Surgeon General’s 
studies proving that smoking is without doubt harmful to health. 
However, an examination of the U. S. Agriculture Department’s 
books, reveals that the same government spends billions every 
year to buy tobacco at an inflated price and sells it at a loss, 
to companies who sell it to people who get cancer from smoking it.
Our young people also are fully aware that the CIA, FBI, 
and state and local police keep files on and tap the phones of 
individuals and organizations that somehow used their freedom 
of speech to express opinions not consistent with what our 
government thinks are the right opinions to have.
All of these problems are political, and all are moral 
ones as well. The politicians forge ahead, meeting the problems—  
always with unlimited corruption; but the official church is 
completely silent. Churches in steel communities especially 
don’t preach against pollution; churches in tobacco farm areas 
especially don’t preach against tobacco; and military chaplains
especially don’t preach against Vietnam.
Preaching worthless verbal platitudes from the pulpit,
but ignoring the real moral problems and needs of the people,
the church has gained property and money, but in the process 
has definitely removed itself from any position of moral leader­
ship. The church today is only a shell of ritualistic formal­
ities; true moral spirit has been unquestionably traded in every 
case for expensive buildings and golden shams— the kind of 
ostentatiousness which enraged Jesus Christ about the estblished 
church of his day.
It is time for the church to break the shell of hypocrisy. 
It is time for it to get involved with what is real. It is time 
for it to develop a courageous moral leadership. So long as the 
church refuses to take positions on the great political-moral 
problems of the people, the church will be a useless spiritual 
tomb.
I am not suggesting that the churches should organize 
into political parties, or in any way violate the principle of 
church-state separation. However, since the moral concerns of 
the church and the political problems of the state all converge 
and become one with each other, the church cannot default on 
its responsibility for moral leadership simply because the 
problem is also political. It would be fully as irrational for 
the government to withdraw from a problem on the similarly 
absurd grounds that it was also a moral problem.
Please turn the page and continue reading.
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Neither the church nor the state can use such flimsy 
excuses to escape responsibility. Both must make policies, 
give advice and support to individuals and groups. It is 
only the totaly ignorant who believe that the church-state 
separation principle means the two must have no connection 
with each other. The church and state have such varied rela­
tions as religious practices in government meetings, financial 
support for education to, "In God We Trust" printed on our 
money.
The intelligent person fully realizes that the separa­
tion principle was a reaction to the domination of the British 
government for many years by the Church of England. He is 
certainly aware of the fact that church and state do no now 
have many relations in common. Having the church officially 
speak out, officially take positions on moral issues is cer­
tainly not the same thing as church control of state or, of 
state control of church.
All churches which refuse to speak out on the moral 
problems of modern man are doomed once and for all to be 
little more than a shining robot of morality, devoid of spirit, 
of feeling, of humanity. The real churches, the Christ-like 
churches, will not be afraid of the great moral problems of 
our day. Like Christ, they will speak out against sham, 
injustice, and raan*s continual inhumanity to man.
Please turn the page and continue reading.
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OPEN MODIFICATION MESSAGE
On this and the following pages is a statement prepared 
as an introduction to a forum group gathered to discuss the 
church in modern society. It was prepared and presented by an 
OU student majoring in philosophy.
It has been observed that a church is more than build­
ings, ministers, deacons, and congregations. A church like 
that which Jesus Christ spoke of is a living, breathing spirit 
of love, hope, and charity. Such a church would be alive to 
the moral quandaries, the personal and political problems of 
modern man.
There are fewer differences now between moral and 
political problems. For example, Vietnam is a war whose origin 
was somewhat political. To some extent, it was the temporary 
refusal of the United States to allow the unifying elections—  
which had been agreed to in the 1954 Geneva Agreements— that 
partially precipitated our military involvement there. Many 
who are knowledgeable in history, now to one degree or another 
believe that the war is a tragic mistake. The major remaining 
argument is over what is the better way of getting out.
Vietnam is not exclusively a political problem; it is 
for the most part a moral one as well. Bright, young men 
wrestle daily with their consciences over the moral dilemma 
of how to be loyal to one's country and yet satisfy one's 
belief against killing in a war of at least questionable 
morality.
What have the churches done for these men faced with 
great moral crises? Officially they have done very little.
Not many churches or councils of churches have openly supported 
or denounced the war. Not many have adopted an official policy 
of advising young men either to refuse to serve or, to serve 
with God's blessing.
Our churches preach love of fellowman, unselfishness, 
tolerance, etc. In contrast to what is taught, the young of 
our nation see the political system repressing the rights of 
minority groups; see that the market place is somewhat con­
trolled by greed; see that material wealth— not love, tolerance, 
unselfishness or humanity— is part of the basis of power in 
government. They see a system which pays in the billions to 
farmers for not producing, or to buy and store at inflated 
prices what is produced, while money to feed impoverished 
families, to fight pollution, to aid medical research, and to 
help education is so cautiously given that it is often con­
siderably insufficient for most of our needs. If someone 
.Tiist be paid for doing nothing, the young wonder why we can't 
spend as lavishly on other more serious problems.
Please turn the page and continue reading.
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The young face an environment threatened by pollution 
created partially by businessmen who sometimes choose profit 
over pollution research. They see a government forbid tele­
vision advertising about smoking, due to the Surgeon General’s 
studies proving that smoking is frequently harmful to health. 
However, any examination of the U. S. Agriculture Department’s 
books, reveals that the same government spends billions every 
year to buy tobacco at an inflated price and sells it at a 
loss, to companies who sell it to people who get cancer from 
smoking it.
Our young people also suspect that the CIA, FBI, and 
state and local police keep files on and tap the phones of 
individuals and organizations that somehow used their freedom 
of speech to express opinions not consistent with what our 
.government thinks are the right opinions to have.
Many of these problems are political, and many are moral 
ones as well. The politicians forge ahead, meeting the-prob­
lems— often with some corruption; but the official church is 
usually silent. Churches in steel communities don’t generally 
preach against pollution; churches in tobacco farm areas don’t 
generally preach against tobacco; and military chaplains don’t 
generally preach against Vietnam.
Preaching dubious verbal platitudes from the pulpit, 
but ignoring the real moral problems and needs of the people, 
the church has gained property and money, but in the process 
has to a degree removed itself from any significant position 
of moral leadership. T’he church today is often a shell of 
ritualistic formalities; true moral spirit has often been 
traded for expensive buildings and golden shams— the kind of 
ostentatiousness which enraged Jesus Christ about the estab­
lished church of His day.
It is time for the church to break the shell of hypocrisy. 
It is time for it to get involved with what is real. It is 
time for it to develop a courageous moral leadership. So long 
as the church refuses to take positions on the great political- 
moral problems of the people, the church will be a useless 
spiritual tomb.
I am not suggesting that the churches should organize 
into political parties, or in any way violate the principle 
of church-state separation. However, since the moral concerns 
of the church and the political problems of the state increas­
ingly converge and become one with each other, the church 
cannot default on its responsibility for moral leadership 
simply because the problem is also political. It would be 
quite as irrational for the government to withdraw from a 
problem on the similarly absurd grounds that it was also a 
moral problem.
Please turn the page and continue reading.
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Neither the church nor the state can use such flimsy 
excuses to escape responsibility. Both must make policies, 
give advice and support to individuals and groups. Just a 
few of the more ignorant ones believe that the church-state 
separation principle means the two must have no connection 
with each other. The church and state have such varied rela­
tions as religious practices in government meetings, financial 
support for education to "In God We Trust" printed on our 
money.
Generally, the intelligent person realizes that the 
separation principle was a reaction to the domination of the 
British government for many years by the Church of England.
He is usually aware of the fact that church and state do have 
many relations in common. Having the church officially speak 
out, officially take positions on moral issues, does not even 
approximate the same thing as church control of state, or of 
state control of church.
Most churches which refuse to speak out on the moral 
problems of modern man are for the most part doomed to be 
little more than a shining robot of morality, devoid of spirit, 
of feeling, of humanity. The real churches, the Christ-like 
churches will not be afraid of the great moral problems of our 
day. Like Christ, they will speak out against sham, injustice, 
and man's frequent inhumanity to man.
Turn to next page
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in this part there are six semantic differentials, a 
type of attitude scale. Evaluate the concept at the top of 
each semantic differential in terms of the bi-polar adjectives 
below the concept. For example, if you were to evaluate the 
concept "Liquor by the Drink" and you think it is unhealthy, 
you would mark an X as below:
Liquor by the Drink
Good: X : Bad
If you feel that it is quite healthy, of course your X would 
be placed nearer to the Good pole.
The middle space should be considered "neutral." Check 
this space if you feel that neither adjective applies to the 
concept, or if you feel both adjectives apply equally to the 
concept.























Please continue on next page
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Following is a brief test over the material you have 
just read. This test is not in any way related to your work 
in this course. Your instructor will not see the results.
The tests will be scored by a laboratory assistant who will 
know you only by a number and not by your name.
Please read and answer each question carefully, but work
at a steady pace. If you are not sure of the answer, circle 
the one which seems right.
Please circle only one alternative per question.
Please do not turn back to see the message again.
1. The differences between moral and political problems were 
said to be:
a. greater than ever
b. fewer than ever
c. none at all now
d. most difficult
2. The U. S. Military involvement in Vietnam was said to be:
a. Partially caused by our refusal to hold unifying 
election.
b. Caused by our desire to help keep South Vietnam free.
c. Mostly caused by our desire to stop Communism.
d. Completely caused by our refusal to hold unifying 
elections.
3. The reason given for the U. 8, refusal to allow the 
unifying elections to be held was:
a. It wasn’t possible to have truly free elections.
b. South Vietnam refused to consider elections with 
Communists’ candidates running.
c. Ho Chi Minh, leader of the North, would have won the 
vote and the country would have gone under Communist 
control.
d. None of these were given in the message.
4. The U. S. position on the proposal for having unifying ' 
elections was said to be:
■ a. firm refusal
b. a temporary refusal
c. an absolute refusal
d. none of these
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5. The author stated that Vietnam was a moral problem:
a. for most people
b. for all people
c. for all institutions
d. all of these
6. According to the author, the Vietnam War is:
a. a tragic mistake
b. of questionable morality
c. totally immoral
d. a and b above
e. a and c above




d. all of these






9. The author said that the government pays billions to 
farmers for:
a. products at inflated prices
b. producing nothing
c. a and b above
d. neither a and b
10. Pollution was said to be
a. caused entirely by business
b. caused to a very large extent by business
c. caused to some extent by business
d. caused by both business and government
11. The statement/message focused on the problems faced by:
a. American citizens in general
b. Middle-class Americans
c. Young Americans
d. All of these
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12. The author stated that the Surgeon-General »s studies 
showed that:
a. Smoking was correlated with lung cancer
b. Smoking is often harmful to health
c. Smoking is undoubtedly harmful to health
d. Smoking is positively a cause.of cancer,
13. The official church was said to be:
a. Sometimes silent on the major problems
b. Usually silent on the major problems
c. Nearly always silent on the major problems
d. Usually speaks out on the major problems
14. One important reason suggested for the silence of the 
official church on major problems is:
a. that some political problems aren*t relevant to 
church life
b. that many churches have congregations whose livelihood 
in one way or another depends on the industry-caused 
problems
c. They don't wish to appear radical
d. None of these
15. The church was said:
a. to be increasingly interested in political problems
b. to have lost some of its moral leadership
c. to have given up nearly all of its moral leadership
d. to have genuine concern for all mankind
16. The author suggested that churches should:
a. organize political parties
b. send official lobbyists to the power centers of 
government
c. officially take stands on political-moral problems
d. confine its advice on political-moral problems to 
private cases.
17. The author suggested that churches should avoid positions 
on issues when:
a. the problem is mostly political
b. the solution is against the consensus of the community
c. the government would be unnecessarily embarrassed
d. none of these
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18. The church and state have had:
a. hardly any relations in common
b. many relations in common
c. no common relations
d. none of these
19. Church-state separation means that:
a. the church must not officially speak out on any 
major political problem
b. the state must not involve itself with largely 
moral problems
c. the church should not control the state; and the 
state must not control the church
d. all of these.
20. The overall tone of the message was:
a. mild
b. strong
c. mild and reasonable
d. mild and unreasonable
e. strong and reasonable
• f. strong and unreasonable
